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The intent of this project was to provide design recommendations to mitigate future 
wildland fire damage, with reference to the devastation incurred in Paradise, California, from the 
Camp Fire at the end of the 2018 fire season. The town of Paradise is uniquely positioned in a 
rural, heavily wooded, mountainous channel with few transportation routes, intensifying both the 
exposure to wind-aided wildland fire and the hindrance of evacuation and emergency response. 
The project scope included the structural design of a single-family residence and its non-
structural material recommendations that can better withstand fire, as well as town-wide 
measures to improve preparedness. Though the recommendations of this report are based upon 
the most recent engineering knowledge and practice regarding structural fire resilience and 
community emergency preparedness, the Camp Fire proves human comprehension of nature’s 
capacity for destruction will always be insufficient. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
The intent of this project was to provide design recommendations to mitigate future 
wildland fire damage, with reference to the devastation incurred in Paradise, California, from the 
Camp Fire at the end of the 2018 fire season. The project scope included the structural design of 
a single-family residence and its non-structural material recommendations, as well as town-wide 
measures. 
The Camp Fire (located in Butte County of Northern California) began at 6:30 am on 
November 08, 2018 the tail-end of the longest and most severe fire season in California state 
history. The region had only received three percent (3%) of its average autumn rainfall and 
experienced several windstorms in the days prior to the fire’s ignition, compounding the region’s 
vulnerability by distributing dry fuels over otherwise-non-combustible surfaces (Belles, 2018). 
Canyon gusts, high atmospheric pressures, and parched vegetation propelled the fire “football-
field lengths within seconds,” according to Cal-Fire spokesperson Scott McClean, spitting 
embers a quarter- to a half-mile ahead of the fire’s body, according to Philip Rose, a member of 
the Paradise Fire Department who defended his town from the fire that would exede state records 
for speed, deadliness, and destructiveness (Rose, 2019). By noon on November 08, over half the 
Town of Paradise had been consumed in fire (Taylor, 2019). As of Sunday, November 11, there 
were 42 confirmed deaths, awarding the Camp Fire the dubious honor of most deadly fire in state 
history. As hundreds of evacuees spent Thanksgiving in a Walmart parking lot on November 22, 
the fire was 95% contained after seven (7) inches of precipitation aided firefighting efforts (CBS 
News, 2018). Three days later, containment reached 100%, marking the beginning of a long and 
arduous recovery process, with some 52,000 people displaced and 85 dead (Associated Press, 
2018).  
The town of Paradise is uniquely positioned in a rural, heavily wooded, mountainous 
channel with few transportation routes, intensifying both the exposure to wind-aided wildland 
fire and the hindrance of evacuation and emergency response. Estimates suggest monumental 
challenges in the rebuilding process, with 90% of the town’s homes destroyed (Lillis, 2018). The 
Paradise community experiences generational poverty and minimal outside financial assistance, 
further exacerbating recovery efforts. Coordinating with governmental and private insurance 





This design team intended to help the residents of Paradise rebuild their lives by 
providing housing stock improvement recommendations that can better withstand fire seasons to 
come in addition to improved town-wide preparedness. Fire response and resilience will be an 
ongoing concern in Paradise, but civil engineers have the opportunity to facilitate community 
prosperity through disaster planning and mitigation.  
 
CHAPTER 2: Building Material Alternatives 
2.1 Fire Rating Classification 
In order for a house to be more fire resilient, materials that have higher fire ratings will be 
utilized in the design. It was not in the scope of this project to obtain an official fire rating on the 
proposed house design, due to high prices. 
 
2.2 Materials  
In the design process, materials were chosen based on fire resistiveness, credibility, and 
constructability. Primarily, fire resistiveness was prioritized when choosing the materials. To 
avoid problems of reliability with companies, materials were primarily chosen from the ICC-ES 
(“Reports Directory”). The ICC-ES is a nonprofit, “limited liability company that does technical 
evaluation of building products, component’s methods, and materials.” The “Reports Directory” 
of the ICC-ES website provides various materials that have been tested to meet various building 
codes.  
From this selection, the siding, plaster, insulation, sheathing, fire tape/sealant, and all 
other aspects of the house were chosen. A problem encountered with this method is the lack of 
windows tested in the ICC-ES that are viable options for residential homes. Also, this limited list 
of material options disallowed for shopping for the least expensive options on the market. 
Choosing to prioritize legitimacy of companies over expediency, was a trade the team was 
willing to make since the cost of materials far exceeds the cost of any human life.  
 
2.3 Wall Sections 
A uniform wall section was utilized on all walls of this house. Research was conducted 
on various building materials and different design ideas. The design process began with various 




designed to optimize fire resistivity in the walls. This design was comprised of the following 
layers from interior to exterior: ⅝” Gypsum Board, 4” Steel Studs with Mineral wool insulation, 
⅝” Gypsum Board, Vapor Barrier, and Fiber Cement Siding.  
This design of the walls assumed the danger of fire comes from the exterior. The various 
layers are all ICC-ES approved and fire retardant in some capacity. The Mineral Wool is 
Rockwool Comfortboard 80 Mineral Wool Thermal Insulation Board (“COMFORTBOARD™ 
80.”). This insulation adds at least 15 minutes of run time, and is a noncombustible material that 
melts at 2150 degrees Fahrenheit (“COMFORTBOARD™ 80.”). Siding on the outside is 
Hardieboard HardiePlank Lap Siding, which is also highly fire retardant, and when tested with 
wood cross section yields a one hour run time. Even the in between details, such as the 3M Fire 
tape used to seal, and the Tyvek Water and Vapor Barrier are all ICC-ES approved and 
specialize in being fire retardant quality.   
 
2.4 Roofing 
The roof is a steel truss structure. Similar to the walls, ICC-ES insulation and sheathing 
were chosen for the design. Lokseam Roof Panels will decor the outside of the steel roof, 
followed by mineral wool and then the structural steel. The insulation chosen was the same 
mineral wool as used in the walls, which was compressible. On top of the roof will be adhesive 
solar panels, Mia Sole Flex series. This flexible, thin film technology easily sticks to roofs and 
provides solar power for homes.  
 
2.5 Windows and Doors 
The ICC Evaluation Services Reports were used for determining a door for the house. 
The Special-Lite Sandstone Textured FRP/Aluminum Hybrid Door was chosen. The door and 
window selection was arguably the most difficult part of material decision due to various 
reasons. First, doors and windows that obtain higher fire ratings are most likely used in non-
residential applications. Most glass companies through the ICC-ES that had a fire rating are also 
not aesthetically pleasing. Second, due to most of the windows/doors not being residential based, 
prices are sometimes higher or more difficult to obtain. Calls were made to numerous 
manufacturers, with no responses received and in the end a detailed spreadsheet was created to 




Tables 1 and 2 can be viewed below, with detailed explanation of pros and cons for each 
option. After comparing products wholistically based on aesthetics, fire-resistivity, price, and 
constructability, a final door and window product were chosen. The team decided on prioritizing 
fire resistivity over price since the cost of one human life is invaluable. The Special Lite door has 
an official 90 minute rating which is optimal for this design. Although expensive (still waiting on 
response with quote), the fiberglass door still is aesthetically pleasing without compromising the 
safety of the door. The window or glass chosen is from Saftifirst brand, also an ICC-ES approved 
glass. After calling the manufacturer, the company does in fact provide windows for residential 
projects including any size requests. The price is $300 per square foot, the most expensive of the 
window options, however, this window is rare. The Saftifirst brand has a two hour gel insulated 
within the windows that, if fire were nearby, would withstand the radiant heat for up to two 
hours. The company also includes installation with the pricing, which would expedite 
construction and lower associated construction costs. Most importantly, it is steel clad which 
performs well in fire. Compared to other potential window options, it was difficult to find non-
vinyl windows that are not for aesthetics.  
Table 1: Comparison of Potential Doors. 





● Very durable 
● 90 minute rating 
● Fiberglass 









$430.91 ● Cheaper 
● Fiberglass 








● 20 minute fire rated 
● Steel door 
● Prehung 
● Wood Frame 






$275 ● 3 hour fire rating 
● Steel 
● Aesthetically pleasing 






$150 ● WHI approval 
● Steel 
● Aesthetically pleasing 
● No ICC-ES 
approval 





Table 2: Comparison of Potential Windows. 









●  Steel clad 
● Open for homes 
● ICC-ES approved 
● Gel for heat 
● Dual Paned 
























CHAPTER 3: Structural System Resilience 
3.1 Architectural Layout 
The structure’s layout and sizing were chosen to be similar to the footprints and look of 
the homes before the fire. The single story structure is 1200 square feet with slight offsets of 
three (3) feet (ft) or five (5) ft on each of the four faces. The ceilings are 10 ft tall. The exterior 
walls extend past 10 ft tall in the areas on the north and south sides of the house that extend 
forward and backward from the central rectangular portion. There are two external doors located 








Figure 1: Floor Plan. 
The major difference between the style of the previous houses and the current design is 
that there are no overhangs and there are a minimal amount of valleys on the roof. Overhangs are 
a likely area where embers will get trapped and begin turning into flames. Valleys are susceptible 
to accumulating debris that fuels fires. Too simplistic of a design, however, is not aesthetically 
pleasing and restricts variation from house to house. It was therefore decided to include a 
separate gable roof system of the east and west extensions, as in Section 3.3.  
 
3.2 Wall Framing 
Design with Cold Formed Steel (CFS) is similar to wood in that both are used as light-
gauge framing systems. The stud spacing chosen was 24 inches (in.) on center (o.c.) based on the 
loading (both dead and live) from the roof. The typical wall section is an exterior, load bearing 
wall that is comprised of a top and bottom track with a stud (normal to the track) sandwiched in 
between. Other wall sections include window or door openings, corners, and areas where interior 
walls frame in to load bearing walls. See Section 3.5 for connection details. All wall framing 
members are 400S200-54 studs and are oversized for ease of constructability and to stay within 
safety thresholds. The gravity loads taken into account for the wall design are shown in Tables 
A-1 and A-2. (Appendix A: Structural Drawings) 
 
3.3 Roof  
As previously explained, the roof system did not include overhangs and was designed 
with minimal valleys. Figure 2 shows the general roof plan with a shallow pitch of 3:12. The 
apex lies at the centerline of the inner main rectangle of the structure’s footprint. Likewise the 






Figure 2: Roof Plan. 
The roof truss system was comprised of two truss systems. Figure 2 shows the layout of 
the types of trusses and their locations. The “common truss” was larger in size and covers the 
majority of the structure, spanning 24 ft and 9 in. (Figure A-1). The “gable truss” system covered 
the east and west extensions (Figure A-2). All trusses were spaced at 24 in. o.c. 
 
3.4 Foundation  
The foundation was a standard concrete slab-on-grade and is shown in Figure A-3. The 
concrete was specified to have a minimum 28 day specified compressive strength (f’c) of 2500 
pounds per square inch (psi) per IRC 2012 Table R402.2. The slab was four (4) in. thick with 12 
in deep footings at the edges. The footings had one No. 4 bar at the top and bottom of the footing 
and No. 3 vertical dowels with standard hooks on each end at 48 in. o.c. 
 
3.5 Connection Details 
The various elements of the structure had to be connected to form one coherent building. 
These connections included foundation-to-wall, wall-to-roof, and wall-to-wall connections, as 
well as a configuration to allow openings for doors and windows. Most connections are standard 
for CFS construction, but some details are designed specifically to enhance fire resilience.  
Notice in Figure A-4 that the configuration of the studs in the corner seal the wall-to-wall 
connection. This detail would block the fire from entering from an area that would have 




enter the structure—rationalizes the use of a break shape over the edge of the roof truss (Figure 
A-7).  
 
3.6 Lateral Bracing  
The structure had to be braced against wind and seismic loads. The largest lateral load is 
the wind loads in the north-south direction, which is 16.7 kips (k). The wind load in the east-west 
direction is 8.2 k. The horizontal component of the seismic force is 2.4 k and the vertical seismic 
force is 3.1 k. The lateral design system was composed of tension strap bracing (Figure A-7). 
The member size calculations are found in Appendix A. The strap is 5 in. wide and 0.0329 in. 
thick. 
 
CHAPTER 4: Community-wide Fire Resistivity 
4.1 Property-level Resilience 
Cal-fire offers adequate and appropriate information for property owners to maintain 
their parcel to reduce fire susceptibility, but dissemination and implementation could be 
improved. The team compiled existing infographics that ought to be disseminated to community 
members (Appendix B: Compilation of Infographics). The team recommends developing an 
infographic specifying which plants are most desired and least desired for defensible-space and 
drought/fire resistance capacity. Compiling existing infographics into one singular document 
could be beneficial, so long as comprehensibility was maintained. Additionally, Cal-Fire website 
http://www.readyforwildfire.org/ includes animated videos and other easily digestible 
information.  
 
4.2 Town-wide Resilience 
4.2.1 Alternative Energy Sources 
The Camp Fire destroyed some 14,000 structures and will constitute a significant 
financial burden for any human party deemed responsible for its ignition (Paris, 2019). The 
largest utility company in California, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), anticipates its 
infrastructure will be found liable for sparking the wildfire. In December 2018, California’s 
Attorney General raised the possibility of criminal charges for failing to maintain its electrical 




investigation (Brekke, 2019). The unprecedented ferocity of this fire resulted from a confluence 
of conditions including weather, habitat, and the ever-increasing encroaching of human 
development into fire-prone regions so that any unlucky spark could engender a cascade of 
destruction. Of the 21 major fires in Northern California in 2017, 17 (80%) were caused by 
power lines, poles, and other equipment owned by PG&E (Johnson, 2018). This design team has 
found no evidence that PG&E is especially negligent in maintaining its infrastructure, but instead 
credits this disproportionate representation in wildfire liability with its largeness. Rather than 
suggest one particular utility company should be scapegoated, the inherent dangers of high-
powered energy transmission across increasingly fire-prone rural terrain are evidenced in the 
2017 fire season.  
Regardless of the utility industry’s increasing propensity to ignite unprecedented 
wildfires and the contributing environmental factors of which a utility company has no means of 
control, current legal precedent places PG&E economically responsible for the insurmountable 
costs of the Camp Fire devastation even without evidence of negligence (Penn, 2019). In 
anticipation of “billions of dollars in possible liabilities and nearly two dozen lawsuits from 
victims of the Camp Fire,” PG&E filed for bankruptcy in January of 2019 in anticipation of 
(Paris, 2019). PG&E and other California utilities are requesting state permission to raise service 
rates for customers in order to implement safety improvements and offset wildfire financial risks 
(Penn, 2019). If legislators “make it harder for property owners to seek damages from utilities 
for wildfires,” a PG&E spokesperson expressed willingness to reduce the requested rate, though 
opponents view both offers as “looking for a bailout by another name.” 
PG&E’s bankruptcy argued that the “staggering debts” incurred by their negligently 
maintained power lines’ sparking wildfires ought to negate its “high-priced renewable energy 
contracts” (Rogers, 2019). The executive director of a Sacramento non-profit, Center for Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Technologies, fears California’s green energy goals may be disrupted 
if not “wrecked” if PG&E’s solar and wind contracts are broken. PG&E argues that requiring the 
company to comply with contracts it signed “over the past 15 years” places “those renewable 
energy companies ahead of other potential creditors, including wildfire victims.”  
Three months after initial evacuation, at the February 2019 Paradise Town Council 
meeting, community members laughed bitterly at the PG&E representative’s clear intention to 




pointed out not to demonize the profit-driven company, but validate the community’s 
dissatisfaction and distrust of external energy sourcing for the town’s future. This engineering 
team recommends investigating alternative energy sourcing that could double as job-creating 
programs that could promote community cohesion. Adhesive solar paneling as described in 
section 2.4 would offset rural utility infrastructure requirements in the Town’s proximity. Energy 
storage could be achieved by pumping water up any of the neighboring geographic inclines, to be 
returned as hydropower when necessary. The channelized terrain that exacerbated the Camp 
Fire’s speed could prove to be a valuable wind farming opportunity. The Community Choice 
Aggregation (CCA) is offered in Butte County to governmental entities to purchase or generate 
electricity with PG&E delivering and maintaining services (Butte County, 2013). The feasibility 
study projects two percent (2%) savings to customers through the CCA. Though this program 
indirectly reduces fire exposure by slowing carbon emissions, the dangers of transmission lines 
persists with CCA energy transport. Burying transmission lines, where equipment malfunction 
would pose significantly less potential to ignite a wildfire, was a highly desirable option for 
community members at the February Council meeting for whom the increased upfront 
implementation cost pales in comparison to the monumental costs associated with 90% of the 
community’s housing being reduced to ash.  
 
4.2.2 Evacuation Plan 
Philip Rose, engineer at the Paradise Fire Department (PFD), defended his town from the 
Camp Fire. In reflecting three months later, he cited the speed and scale of the blaze as 
unprecedented, saying, “within an hour and a half, most of the town had burned or was on fire, 
actively burning.” Rose insisted his community had been preparing, and that the threat of 
wildland fire specific to the Paradise region had been well-researched, for decades, but nothing 
could have prepared them for the intensity of the Camp Fire. All things considered, this first 
responder was amazed that “we have only 85 deaths, while tragic as it is… we were expecting 
thousands” of dead, citing the “sheer luck and tenacity” of his fellow townsfolk in escaping the 
flames (Rose, 2019). One survivor Darrel Wilkins sat in his car with three hospital patients, 
“stuck in traffic along with thousands of others” as trees, structures and cars “exploded into 
flames” in front and around them (Arthur, 2019). 
The unprecedented ferocity of the Camp Fire is best put into perspective through a 




Fire 85 years ago. On October 3, 1933, some 1,500 workers were widening roads in a ravine 
when they were sent to the ridge-top to extinguish a small brush fire that had started “in the 
canyon beneath the hill” (Harrison, 2015). In a sudden wind shift, 29 of the untrained firefighting 
men were trapped and killed by the flames. Similarly, the majority of citizens who perished in 
the Camp Fire’s consumption of the Town of Paradise were trapped in grid-lock traffic as all 14 
Town evacuation zones attempted to outrun the flames. Fireman Rose recalls truck after truck 
exhausting its water-tank as fire-fighting efforts resorted to containment as opposed to 
suppression - allowing neighbors’ homes to burn down as resources were devoted to preventing 
the next home from catching fire.  
The Town of Paradise had one of the most robust evacuation plans in the country (Arthur, 
2019). Few feasible recommendations can be offered to more effectively evacuate all 27,000 
residents on time scales comparable to that imposed by the Camp Fire. The geographic 
topography limits widening roads and even if doing so were feasible, designing a small town’s 
transportation infrastructure to accommodate mass exodus would have tremendous negative 
consequences for community morale and aesthetic desirability.  
 
4.2.3 Town-wide Defensible Space 
Based upon regional climate models, the unprecedented conditions that facilitated the 
Camp Fire are expected to be the “new normal” (McDermid, 2018). As explained in section 
4.2.2, transportation planning is severely limited in its ability/capacity to respond to fires, 
comparable to the Camp Fire, wherein whole towns must fully evacuate in less than hours. An 
alternative option that could prove more feasible, and psychologically acceptable, would be to 
augment the resilience of the Town’s perimeter to prevent fire penetration and/or reduce the 
Town’s susceptibility to the spreading of fire (see recommendations of Chapters 1 and 2). As 
evidenced in inspecting the aftermath of the Camp Fire, structures were often either untouched or 
completely reduced to ash (Taylor, 2019). Though the housing improvements outlined in this 
report are recommended based upon the most recent engineering knowledge regarding structural 
fire resilience, the Camp Fire proves human comprehension of nature’s capacity for destruction 
will always be fallible. Once the exterior of the structure becomes penetrated (often from embers 
landing in gutters and starting small debris fires), all fire-resilience integrities became easily 
compromised. Under sustained heat, the noncombustible materials recommended in this report 




a mitigation and not a cure to the Town’s exposure to fire damage. With adequate thoughtful 
planning, a system could be designed, implemented and maintained to buffer the Town from 
intrusion by fire. 
There is, of course, an inherently politically divisive element to such a system. It is 
impossible to not exclude some community-members and neighbors and that would likely 
undermine community cohesion. One solution would be to create a Town-wide tax that would 
pay for system maintenance and double as an insurance pool for community members whose 
homes may be lost in the future. Additionally, external insurance companies may soon begin to 
lower costs for communities taking innovative approaches to natural disaster resilience, if they 
do not already. The comparative reliability between these potential revenue streams emphasizes 
the human aversion to upfront costs and liability, which will prove to hamper all Town-wide 
emergency resilience system considerations. 
Considering California’s drought and the weighty politics often attached to water 
collection rights, waterless systems of fire suppression were first considered. Fire is a natural 
earth systems phenomenon requiring heat, oxygen, and fuel. Reducing the heat as a wall of fire 
moves in, spitting embers a quarter- to half-mile, was quickly deemed infeasible. Engineers 
design closed laboratory and technology spaces so that oxygen is removed from a contained 
space, immediately suffocating the detected flame. The scale of containment and implementation 
of such a system in the mountainous outskirts of the Paradise community is several magnitudes 
more complex than the typical lab, complicated further by the extreme danger of malfunction 
and the liability associated with a densely oxygenated pocket of air in the vicinity of conditions 
comparable to the Camp Fire. Emergency fuel reduction is performed by firefighters in the 
prioritization of containment over suppression. Robotic assistance could one day be of benefit to 
collect debris up to the point they are overtaken by fire or are somehow able to escape, but could 
easily encumber firefighters’ expert judgment and life-protecting effort. Another waterless 
system alludes to the ultimate recommendation, as a physical barrier to the fire would most 
effectively slow the progression of fire without expensive on-going performance testing and 
maintenance. A wall made of fire-resistant materials would incur high upfront material and 
environmental costs, affect long-term runoff and wildlife patterns, and over time debris would 
collect in the proverbial corners of the wall, creating a fire ladder or other weak spot in the fire-




could catch first responders and evacuees by surprise or even trap the unlucky community 
member.  
Physical reliability without ongoing maintenance costs could be achieved by developing 
a Town-wide defensible space, a cleared ring with a 100 ft minimum width according to Cal-
Fire’s property-level defensible space recommendations. The width of the space would be 
recommended larger with a design fire comparable to the Camp Fire, though the same aesthetic 
tradeoff as in section 4.2.2 is important for the community to keep in mind. The serviceability of 
the town perimeter could be improved by saturating the plant matter and debris with water as a 
temporary fire resistivity. Runoff could be collected and stored by the town to supplement other 
available water sources to be time-released by the evacuation system. The same treatment 
requirements as in a river would be appropriate to potentially land on slower-moving evacuee, 
provided the rate of discharge was gentle enough. This gentleness is a tradeoff with effectiveness 
against a raging firewall whose radiant heat can evaporate across great distance. The fastest 
release system can be modeled by exploding water to neutralize bombs, wherein distribution is 
difficult to target, alluding to a high propensity for unintended collateral damage. A ground 
deluge/sprinkler would reduce water evaporation as compared to elevated deluge/sprinkler, 
though extent of potential fuel saturation would also be reduced. The elevation support and 
sprinkler piping material fire resistivity would not be necessary if the system is expected to only 
function in anticipation of the fire, though its melting could complicate the post-fire cleanup 
process and the system potential to act as a fire ladder or contribute to the fire is of utmost 
importance to consider. The final water system considered is modeled after feudal castles’ motes, 
wherein water would seep and flow out of the mote to saturate groundcover, though elevated 
potential fuels would be unaffected. The system could be segmented to reduce water demand, 
though determining where segments begin and end would require complicated political and 
engineering deliberations. The buildup of debris in the mote could aid or clog water distribution 
and aid fire penetration.  
After looking into the topographic terrain of the town’s boundary and considering the 
costs associated with ongoing maintenance and performance verification (Figure 3), an 
automated emergency water-release system is deemed infeasible. Creating a defensible space 
perimeter around the town is recommended, however, as it would aide firefighters in preventing 




species could be preselected and available for community members to plant and cultivate. 
Individual families, school classes, and other local organizations would be allowed and 
encouraged to sponsor sections of the defensible perimeter.  
The upfront cost of this defensible space plan includes clearing the land and a three (3) 
in. layer of compost (or combination of potting and topsoil) (BH&G, 2019). The Town’s pine 
needles could be diverted to be used as a mulch, or bark chips from the trees removed post-fire 
for a longer-lasting mulch. Edible plants are not recommended due to potential contaminants 
from the fire as well as post-harvest plant waste representing a fuel source. Though community 
members would be encouraged to maintain the garden space, a small ongoing cost would be 
restocking approved plant seeds, occasional campaigns to encourage participation, and perhaps a 
paid maintenance team to facilitate preparedness during the peak fire season would be worth the 
cost of that municipal government job program.  
 
Figure 3: Approximately one-fifth (⅕) of the Town’s perimeter would require a water 
supply and distribution system deemed unfeasible to adequately saturate fuels in the 
forested mountainous region as fast-moving fire approaches. 
 
 
4.3 Natural Hazards, Aside From Fire 
As with most regions, the Town of Paradise is at risk of a variety of natural disasters. The 
2018 Camp Fire emphasized the town’s exposure to wildland fire, and the majority of this 
project’s scope seeks to mitigate that specific threat. By focusing on one risk, there is the 
potential to overlook other issues. On November 29, 2018, days after the Camp Fire, Butte 
County officials had to renew evacuation orders and deploy swift water rescue teams to save 




scar,” meteorologist Craig Shoemaker noted (Nero, 2018). More variable extreme snow- and 
rainfall led to mudflows and runoff flooding Butte County roads in late January (Elias, 2019). 
The region’s susceptibility to flooding and extreme windstorms ought to be considered, but the 
high risk of earthquake is of particular concern because of tectonic unpredictability. The United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates a 49.7% chance of a major earthquake (magnitude 
5.0 or greater) within 50 km (31.1 miles) of Paradise in the coming 50 years (Homefacts.com). 
There is low risk of tornado and radon1 exposure, but the town is high on the ultraviolet (UV) 
Index. This last risk has community-level consequences on the health system (skin cancer, eye 
degeneration, immune suppression) and can be managed according to dermatological 
recommendations regarding sun exposure. The complicating factor of the town’s UV risk is a 
tradeoff that must be considered in terms of fire exposure: adequate shade ought to be available 
to locals and tourists without creating fire ladders.  
The slow-working UV risk is less relevant to the rebuild process than risk of earthquake 
because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of that natural hazard. According to Dr. 
Lucy Jones of Caltech, “There is no way to predict the time of when [California’s next major 
quake] will happen, but that it will happen is an absolute certainty” (Hobson, 2017). Jones 
assures it is “extremely improbable” that an earthquake will be so large as to affect Los Angeles 
and San Francisco, but one triggering another is “extremely probable.” While the people and 
infrastructure of the Town of Paradise will likely not be directly affected by a “Big One” 
affecting the Bay Area or Southern California, the economic and communication ramifications 
are likely to ripple across the state and globe (Stewart, 1992). The structural component of this 
project’s house design takes into account earthquake loading, and Figure B-8 includes 
earthquake safety recommendations produced by www.ready.gov/earthquakes. The public ought 
to be aware of the building code’s limitations: the majority of structures are designed to undergo 
irreversible damage without catastrophic collapse, to protect life safety with little to no 
consideration for the economic aftermath. Beyond encouraging individual citizen preparedness, 
the Town of Paradise could benefit from forming a Council Subcommittee explicitly dedicated to 
preparedness and response to the myriad natural threats. 
                                                 
1 A cancer-causing gas formed by the natural radioactive decay of uranium in the earth’s crust. For more 





4.3.1 Disaster Response in Sonoma County, a Case Study 
After the extreme flooding of 2019 turned towns to islands, Sonoma County supervisor 
Lynda Hopkins expressed certainty that the community would “pull together” and become 
stronger as they had through previous disasters, namely the 2017 Tubbs Fire, whose title of most 
destructive fire in California history was usurped by the 2018 Camp Fire (O’Dowd, 2019). 
Hopkins continued: “In many ways, we now feel like we are ground zero for the impacts of 
climate change” due to the region’s more severe fire and flood seasons projected for the summer 
and winter, respectively. She was confident the Office of Recovery and Resiliency (ORR), 
formed after the 2017 wildfire devastation, will aide the County’s response to the 2019 flood 
season.  
The ORR collaborates with various County departments and agencies, cities and other 
jurisdictions, nonprofits, and other community stakeholders, resulting in a strategic document 
approved by the Board of Supervisors, after public comment, “to serve as a vision and approach 
for how Sonoma County will recover and emerge more resilient” (“Recovery Framework,” 
2019).The ORR is “tasked with exhaustively pursuing and coordinating all available” funding, 
submitting quarterly progress reports to the Board, meeting regularly with community partners, 
and implementing the preparedness communications Outreach Plan (“Recovery Progress,” 
2019). The County also has departments titled Fire Operations and Training Division, Fire 
Prevention, Fire and Emergency Services, and Emergency Management Division that are, 
respectively, tasked with training volunteer responders; preventing the outbreak of fires in 
unincorporated areas; protecting the environment from the negative impacts of fire; and the 
planning, coordination, and mitigation of county-wide emergencies (“Departments & Agencies,” 
2019). Comparatively, Butte County has a Fire Department, Office of Emergency Management, 
and Water and Resource Conservation Department. These departments may accomplish all the 
County-level preparedness that Sonoma County’s four existing divisions and the ORR address. 
Either way, augmenting the County structure would be outside the control of the Town of 
Paradise, though they could lobby the County to augment the Town’s local support structures. 
Commissioning an evaluation of their County’s preparedness is encouraged to better inform the 
Town Council of the extent of their external support relative to that offered by Sonoma County. 
A more apt comparison for Paradise to assess its preparedness is Santa Rosa, the largest city in 




the Town cannot be expected to achieve the same level of preparedness, but can adapt its 
structures as desired.  
The Santa Rosa Fire Department (SRFD) is organized such that, in addition to overseeing 
the Operations, Administration, and Prevention Bureaus that perform typical city firefighting 
functions, a City Emergency Preparedness Coordinator is under the jurisdiction of the Fire Chief 
(“Strategic Plan”). A “cross section of personnel from all ranks” of the SRFD produced a 
Strategic Five Year Plan, to be revised and refined annually, in order to address the “ever-
increasing demands for fire and life safety services” facing the City. Through the Emergencies 
subset of the Fire Department, the City has produced Continuity of Operations and Emergency 
Operations Plans (COOP and EOP, respectively) to ensure essential government functions can 
respond flexibly and efficiently in future disasters (“Emergency Preparedness”). The City has 
Community Engagement and Economic Development Departments that are not currently 
incorporated into the Town’s list of Departments. These functions, as related to response and 
recovery, could be handled by a Preparedness subset of the Town’s Fire Department or an 
independent Preparedness Department that would consist of a cross-section of volunteers from 
the Town’s existing governing structure.  
Supervisor Hopkins pointed to the County’s efforts to reduce its climate footprint as an 
indirect means of responding to Sonoma County’s exposure to myriad natural disasters. This 
indirect tactic is relevant to the scope of this project in terms of the tradeoff between fire-
resistant materials that incur higher emissions and the cumulative effect of emissions on climate 
intensifying the propensity for extreme weather, with fire in particular for the counties of 
Northern California (Clarke, 2015). Emissions reduction is closely tied to disincentivizing the 
Californian preference for (sub)urbanized sprawl, as opposed to multi-story planning. 
 
4.4 Maintaining a Small-Town Atmosphere While Avoiding Sprawl 
After the 2017 Tubbs Fire destroyed more than 5,000 homes in Sonoma County, the 
governments of Santa Rosa and Sonoma were under pressure to rebuild in wildfire-prone areas 
due to the already-severe housing shortage (Sommer, 2018). California’s decade-old zoning rules 
did not require fire-resilient building standards for almost 40% of the destroyed structures. In the 
rebuild, some homeowners took on the added cost of meeting those standards under no legal 




local leaders’ decisions will affect lives for decades to come. Santa Rosa City Councilmember 
Julie Combs expressed interest in developing programs (funded by governments or neighbors), 
similar to those related to flood risk, to offer homeowners buy-outs, so they need not rebuild if 
they determine the emotional or economic burden of potentially reliving the ordeal to be too 
great for them. Considering 21 of the 22 homes built to the most recent wildfire codes were 
destroyed by the Tubbs fire, it is clear that risk can be reduced but not eliminated.  
The Tubbs fire exacerbated an already inadequate housing market in Santa Rosa. The 
City expedited permit processing and reduced impact fees to incentivise home-building in the 
downtown core, but it cannot eliminate the market for single-family residences on the outskirts 
where wildfire risk is highest. Combs was the lone vote against allowing a 237-unit townhome 
development on a hillside that burned in the Tubbs fire, explaining “I just think we need to not 
put more sleeping people in a fire hazard area” and warning that the new development sets the 
precedent for a sprawling rebuild. The same pressure to approve developments in remote areas 
faces the entire Sonoma County and California as a whole, as high density housing is considered 
less desirable. Combs cites the “strong emotional pull to get what you lost back” that was also 
evident in the Town of Paradise. This issue is further complicated by the Paradise community’s 
fear of metamorphosing a suburb or city atmosphere in place of its characteristic tight-knit small 
town aura before the Camp Fire’s devastation. Building up inherently threatens to urbanize the 
Paradise aesthetic, so architectural design will be integral to balancing safe building practices 
with the community’s ambiance. Leavenworth, WA, is a small town that attracts tourism through 
its quaint architectural themes that mask its low-rise hotel and condo complexes. Similar 
architectural efforts could facilitate a higher density town center and incentivize tourism without 
corrupting the small-town character that attracts so many locals to make the Town of Paradise 
their home.  
 
4.4.1 Mitigation Cannot Eliminate Risk 
Since 2000, California has experienced fifteen of its twenty largest wildfires in recorded 
history (Milman, 2018). Wildfires require more than ignition to wreak havoc, and until recently, 
the speed and direction of winds as well as fuel and terrain conditions acted as natural 
suppressants. In the modern era (1970-present), temperatures in the Western United States are 
increasing at double the global average rate. PFD Engineer Rose was confident that fire had not 




fire season, the frequency and severity of fires has increased as drought and “the ceaseless drive 
to populate fire-prone areas” compound the threat of economic damage and environmental 
trauma (Clarke, 2015). The president of California Professional Firefighters, Brian K. Rice, cites 
parched vegetation, high winds, and low humidity as catalysts for what the State Senate president 
pro tem Toni Atkins recognizes as the “new normal” of massive wildfires as “every bit the same 
kind of disaster as earthquakes, hurricanes and other natural disasters that confront states across 
the country.” The impacts of climate change are inextricably linked to the global propensity for 
wildfires and are already evident in California. If the Camp Fire truly represents the soon-to-be 
typical fire, the Paradise Fire Fighters interviewed are at a loss as to how to balance economic 
and aesthetic concerns with mitigation efforts in ensuring minimal dry fuel loads at the Town’s 
outskirts and interior. The combination of large-scale fires and rapidly increasing temperatures 
may convert much of the forestland into shrub and drought-adapted ecologies that naturally 
sequester less caron, creating a feedback loop to further climate change. Management and 
suppression efforts tend to be less effective under extreme weather conditions (Kitzberger, 
2017). Wildfires are a global Earth system process both integrating and influencing climatic and 
ecosystemic conditions. Every year, the smoke from the wildfires ravaging these forests is 
“visual testimony” of this massive release of carbon that will only spur warming trends. As 
temperatures continue to warm and drought persists in frequency and intensity, the traditional 
strategy of “one-size-fits-all fuel management” will be less and less effective in reducing fire risk 
(Clarke, 2015). Communities large and small will have to rethink where to build and with what 
materials, how to “tweak our presence in ways that won’t worsen the firescape, that nudge both 
city and countryside toward greater resilience,” because as ASU professor Stephen Pyne 




In assessing the aftermath of the Camp Fire in the Town of Paradise, homes built in 
accordance with the 2008 strengthened CA Building Code for fire-prone regions had a better rate 
of survival. The comparison is undermined by the sample sizes, as 51% of the 350 post-2008 
homes and 18% of the 12,100 pre-2008 homes escaped fire damage (Kasler, 2019). One family’s 




warped window frames, a partially charred down spout and a stubborn smoky smell inside,” 
emphasizing the unpredictability of wildfire patterns. The average construction date for Paradise 
housing stock is decades older than 2008, adding high retrofit costs to the already-expensive 
rebuild process. The housing recommendations delineated in Chapters 1 and 2 exceed the 2008 
fire-prone code and are expected to increase resilience and mitigate exposure to fire, but cannot 
eliminate all risk.  
Landscaping according to the Cal-Fire defensible space recommendations and the 
selection of locally adapted plant species aid firefighters in containment and suppression efforts. 
A town-wide defensible space would offer firefighters additional options for site staging and 
prescribed burns to create fire breaks and stop or slow fire’s progression into the Town, where 
structural density and property-owner interests limit the efficacy of achieving adequate 
defensible space to contain and suppress fire within Town boundaries. Climatic conditions are 
expected to continue to exacerbate the Paradise region’s propensity for extreme wildfire, but 
reducing the demand for external energy sources would eliminate some exposure given the 
disproportionate representation of neglected rural power lines serving as ignition sources in the 
2017 Northern California fire season as well as the Camp Fire (Johnson, 2018). Evaluating 
neighboring municipal and county-level fire preparedness methods and structures could be 
illuminating for the Town Council to ensure no gaps exist in the community’s on-going fire 
readiness. A designated Resiliency Councilmember or Subcouncil could facilitate Camp Fire 
recovery as well as response to future natural disasters, fire or otherwise.  
Though the recommendations of this report are based upon the most recent engineering 
knowledge regarding structural fire resilience, the Camp Fire proves human comprehension of 
nature’s capacity for destruction will always be fallible. Once the exterior of the structure 
becomes penetrated, often from embers starting small debris fires in gutters, all fire-resilience 
integrities became easily compromised. The noncombustible materials recommended in this 
report will inevitably melt, though they will not contribute to the fire.  
According to Cal Fire, as many as three million homes lie within the various “fire hazard 
severity zones” around the state (Kasler, 2019). Daniel Gorham, a former firefighter and U.S. 
Forest Service researcher working for a South Carolinian Insurance Institute, points out that 
“California is leaps and bounds ahead of other parts of the country… on the forefront” of U.S. 




programs and additional improvements. Increasing fire exposure is a serious nationwide problem 
affecting engineering, economics, politics, emergency response, and transportation industries. 
The Town of Paradise has lost the luxury of abstract preparedness, but are themselves resilient 
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Table A-1: Roof and Ceiling Loads. 
No. Material Load (psf) 
1 Truss System 1.17 
2 LokSeam 1.25 
3 LP FlameBlock (7/16”) 1.4 
4 Mechanical duct allowance 5 
5 Mineral wool insulation (2") 1.33 
6 LP FlameBlock (7/16”) 1.4 
 Total 11.55 
 
Table A-2: Exterior Wall Loads. 
No. Material Load (psf) 
1 Gypsum Board (5/8") 2.75 
2 Mineral wool insulation (2") 1.33 
3 Structure (362S162-97) 1.85 
4 Furring channels (150F125-33) 0.44 
5 
Fiber Cement Siding 
HardiPlank® Lap Siding 2.4 




Figure A-1: Common Truss Dimensions. 
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Figure A-2: Gable Truss Dimensions. 
 
 
Figure A-3: Thickened Edge Slab. 
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Figure A-4: Wall-to-Wall Corner Connection Perspective View. 
 
 
Figure A-5: Wall-to-Wall Corner Connection Plan. 
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Figure A-6: Brake Shape Detail. 
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Figure A-7: Tension Only Bracing Against Lateral Loads.  
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Appendix B 
Compilation of Infographics 
 
Figure B-1: Defensible Space Flyer, accessible at https://calfire.ca.gov/communications/ 
downloads/fact_sheets/DefensibleSpaceFlyer.pdf.  
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Figure B-2: Page 2 of Defensible Space Brochure, accessible at https://calfire.ca.gov/ 
communications/downloads/fact_sheets/2007DefSpaceBrochure.pdf. 
 
Figure B-3: Page 3 of Defensible Space Brochure, accessible at https://calfire.ca.gov/ 
communications/downloads/fact_sheets/2007DefSpaceBrochure.pdf. 
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Figure B-4: Last Page of Defensible Space Brochure, accessible at https://calfire.ca.gov/ 
communications/downloads/fact_sheets/2007DefSpaceBrochure.pdf. 
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Figure B-5: Homeowners Checklist for Outside Fire Mitigation, accessible at 
https://calfire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/fact_sheets/Checklist.pdf. 
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Figure B-6: Homeowners Checklist for Outside Fire Mitigation, accessible at 
https://calfire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/fact_sheets/Checklist.pdf. 
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Figure B-7: Excerpt of 62-Page Landscaping Plant Guide for Northeastern California, accessible 
at http://www.lassenfiresafecouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Lassen-Fire-Safe-Council- 




B - 7 
  
 
Figure B-7: Excerpt of earthquake preparedness recommendations, accessible at 
https://www.ready.gov/earthquakes. 
